Analysis of the Connecticut Citizens’ Election Program

A Major Qualifying Project
submitted to the Faculty of the

WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Science

By

Matthew Zagaja

Date: March 6, 2009

________________________________________
Professor Kent Rissmiller, Advisor
ABSTRACT

In 2008 Connecticut held its first round of state legislative elections with its new public financing program in place. The purpose of this project was to analyze the impact of the program on candidates and the electoral landscape. It was determined that the program has had a positive impact on competition, and has increased voter confidence in state legislative candidates. It was also determined that participating candidates spent less time fundraising, but spent more and were not more diverse.
CONTENTS

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. 2

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 5

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 6

Background .......................................................................................................................................... 7

Federal Issues in Campaign Finance Reform ....................................................................................... 7

The Federal Election Campaign Act .................................................................................................... 7

Buckley v. Valeo ..................................................................................................................................... 7

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ..................................................................................... 8

McConnell v. FEC .................................................................................................................................. 9

FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life .............................................................................................................. 10

Public Financing of Presidential Elections ............................................................................................ 10

Minnesota’s Public Financing Program ................................................................................................. 11

Wisconsin’s Public Financing Program ................................................................................................ 12

Maine’s Public Financing Program ...................................................................................................... 13

Arizona’s Public Financing System ...................................................................................................... 16

Women and Public Financing .............................................................................................................. 17

Connecticut’s Public Financing Program ............................................................................................ 18

Methods .............................................................................................................................................. 20

Interviews ............................................................................................................................................ 20

Participation ....................................................................................................................................... 21

Electoral Competition ....................................................................................................................... 21

Increasing Diversity of Candidates Running for Public Office .............................................................. 22

Decreasing the Actual or Appearance of Influence by Interest Groups on Candidates ....................... 22

Limiting Excessive Campaign Spending ............................................................................................. 23

Allowing Candidates to Spend Less Time Fundraising ..................................................................... 23

Increasing Voter Confidence and Participation in Elections ................................................................. 23
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge Prof. Rissmiller for his guidance throughout this project. I’d like to give special thanks to the following candidates who agreed to be interviewed for this project:

- Sen. Paul Doyle
- Sen. Kevin Witkos
- Rep. Elizabeth Esty
- Rep. Russell Morin
- Rep. Lawrence Cafero
- Senate Candidate Edwin Vargas
- Former Rep. Richard Ferrari
INTRODUCTION

Campaign finance reform is the term for the various movements and ideas in the United States to modify how elections for public office are conducted. This movement is fueled by a large variety of organizations including the League of Women Voters, Common Cause, and Change Congress. The movement tends to be concerned with issues such as the amount of money candidates take from special interests, and the amount of time candidates must spend raising money compared to engaging directly with voters (“League of Women Voters of the United States | Campaign Finance Reform,” n.d.).

Public financing is one of the most widely discussed and viable options that jurisdictions can consider to achieve the goals of campaign finance reformers. In a clean elections program, a candidate that chooses to participate is required to demonstrate support in order to qualify for a fixed amount of public money to run his campaign. Such support is usually demonstrated through the collection of signatures and small donations from individuals. In exchange for the public money, the candidate agrees to abide by an expenditure limit (Levin, 2006).

Public financing of elections was originally proposed by President Theodore Roosevelt in his 1907 State of the Union Address and was finally brought to fruition in the 1970s with public financing being put into place for Presidential elections and the creation of public financing programs for statewide legislative candidates in Minnesota and Wisconsin. In the 1990’s a resurgence of interest in public financing occurred and new more stringent programs were passed in Arizona and Maine, while programs in other states were updated. Additionally other states such as Hawaii and Massachusetts put limited public financing programs into place (Common Cause, n.d.).

Connecticut is the most recent state to enact a public financing program; a program that is most similar to programs that were put into place in Maine and Arizona. In 2008 the first round of legislative elections subject to this law took place. The goal of this report is to attempt to measure the impact that the public financing program has had on Connecticut legislative elections, and determine whether or not the program has met its goals.
BACKGROUND

**Federal Issues in Campaign Finance Reform**

In 1867 the Federal Government enacted its first campaign finance law, prohibiting Federal Officers from requesting campaign contributions from Navy Yard workers. In 1883 Congress expanded this law to include all federal employees. President Theodore Roosevelt tackled the issue of campaign finance twice. In his 1905 State of the Union Address he called for a prohibition on the contribution to political campaigns by corporations. Then in his 1907 State of the Union Address he tackled it by stating:

> The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organization and machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation should be made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should accept more than a fixed amount from any individual subscriber or donor; and the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could without difficulty be provided. (Roosevelt, 1907)

In 1907 the Tillman Act was passed, prohibiting corporations and national banks from contributing to federal campaigns. By 1911 the first laws were passed requiring disclosure for House and Senate campaigns. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act prevented unions and corporations from making expenditures and contributions in federal elections. However in practice these laws were largely ignored (FEC, n.d.).

**The Federal Election Campaign Act**

The Federal Election Campaign Act (hereinafter FECA) of 1971 required full reporting of contributions and expenditures in federal elections, and also limited the spending on advertisements in these elections. The FECA also provided the legal framework for the segregated campaign funds, commonly known as Political Action Committees, that corporations and unions could establish and fund, and then use to contribute money to federal races. The act also established the Federal financing of presidential elections fund. The first federally funded Presidential election occurred in 1976. In 1974 the act was amended to create the Federal Election Commission, an independent body responsible for the administration and enforcement of FECA. The amendments also instituted strict limits on contributions and expenditures on both political action committees and candidates (FEC, n.d.).

**Buckley v. Valeo**

The spending limits imposed by Congress were challenged in the Supreme Court case *Buckley v. Valeo*. In the case, the court considered whether or not the parts of FECA limiting contributions to a candidate and expenditures in support of the candidate are constitutional. The court ruled that the
contribution limits on individuals were constitutional, as a contribution limit does not restrain the speech of the contributor. The contributor is allowed to express his symbolic support, and there is not much evidence that contribution limits would have a dramatic effect on campaign funding. Additionally the contribution limits themselves compel people to engage in more direct political expression. They also limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large financial contributions. The majority believed that the interests served by restricting contributions justify the limited impact on the first amendment rights of individuals (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976).

However, the limit on expenditures by individuals “relative to a clearly identified candidate” was ruled unconstitutional. The majority believed that such limits would exclude all citizens and groups except political parties, candidates, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most effective modes of communication. The individuals would in effect, be silenced. The majority believed that independent advocacy does not create the same issues of corruption that are caused by large campaign contributions. Additionally limits on the candidate’s spending on his own campaign were ruled unconstitutional as they have a first amendment interest in furthering their own election (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976).

Finally the court ruled that the method of appointing Federal Election Commission officers violated the separation of powers due to four of the appointments being made by Congress, and not the executive branch. This lead to Congress amending FECA in 1976 to repeal the expenditure limits, the one exception being in the case of Presidential candidates who accepted public financing. Congress also modified the way the FEC functioned, so that the FEC commissioners would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate (FEC, n.d.).

The first major impact of this case is how it shaped public financing as a voluntary program instead of an imposition of mandatory rules. Since states cannot limit the expenditures of the candidates through law, they end up having to do it through voluntary contracts signed by candidates agreeing to participate in their program and abide by the rules. Second uncoordinated independent expenditures became the way groups who just can’t give enough because of contribution limits are able to continue to influence elections. Finally Buckley has impaled the ability of lawmakers to limit the spending of self-financed candidates, forcing them to find more creative ways to level the playing field.

**The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002**

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (commonly known as McCain-Feingold, hereinafter BCRA) was an attempt at reforming election law to limit the use of soft money (money raised outside the limits and prohibitions of federal campaign finance law). The act prohibited national parties from raising or spending soft money, required state parties to use hard money or money raised according to certain reporting
requirements for activity affecting federal elections, and placed limits on fundraising by candidates and officeholders on behalf of party committees, other candidates, and non-profit organizations (FEC, n.d.).

In spite of the ban on soft money, the BCRA has lead to the creation of 527 organizations that run issue ads but refuse to register as political committees. The BCRA addressed the use of issue ads to attack candidates by expanding the definition of electioneering advertisement to include ads that expressly refer to a candidate within 60 days of a general election, or 30 days of a primary election (Public Citizen, n.d.).

**McConnell v. FEC**

On December 10, 2003 the Supreme Court ruled in the case of *McConnell v. FEC* where it upheld most of the provisions of the BCRA (*McConnell v. FEC*, 2003). Specifically it upheld the following provisions:

- The prohibition on the national parties’ raising or spending soft money;
- The regulation of state parties’ spending soft money on federal election activity;
- The ban on federal officeholders or candidates’ raising or spending soft money;
- The prohibition on political parties’ transferring or soliciting soft money for politically active, tax-exempt groups (construing this provision to apply only to soft money);
- The ban on state candidates’ spending soft money on public communications that promote or attack federal candidates;
- The act’s definition of “electioneering communication as a broadcast”
- The ban on advertisements mentioning a federal candidate, targeted at their electorate and aired within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election;
- The requirement that corporations and unions use only hard money (instead of soft money treasury funds) to pay for electioneering communications;
- The requirements that individuals disclose their spending on electioneering communications to the FEC;
- The requirement that coordinated electioneering communications be treated as contributions to candidates and parties;
- The statutory definition of “coordination” saying “Congress has always treated expenditures made after a wink or nod as coordinated”;
- The new FCC requirements for candidate disclosure

(Malbin, 2006)

*McConnell v. FEC* also struck down a provision requiring parties to decide whether they would engage in limited coordinated expenditures with a presidential campaign, or if they would engage in unlimited
independent expenditures. This had the effect of allowing parties to engage in both types of expenditures (McConnell v. FEC, 2003).

The impact of McConnell v. FEC is three fold. It put an end to candidates and officeholders soliciting soft money contributions for their political parties. This change led to some donors sending large donations to 527 committees. Finally it led political parties to work harder to make up for their lack of soft money by redoubling their efforts to solicit for new hard money donors (Malbin, 2006).

**FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life**

In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life the Supreme Court held that corporate and labor union funded issue ads were not the functional equivalent of campaign speech. The majority believed that the limits on corporate speech imposed by the BCRA were unconstitutional. The ruling created an exemption for issue ads that were previously regulated by the BCRA. The new standard being that if the ad “could not be reasonably interpreted as being something other than for or against a specific candidate” it was an issue advertisement and thus not subject to limitations under the BCRA (FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 2007).

**Public Financing of Presidential Elections**

FECA allowed for the public financing of the presidential elections beginning in 1976. The elections are financed through a check-off on tax returns where taxpayers may direct $3 ($1 before 1993) to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. However candidates must agree to certain restrictions in order to obtain this public financing.

Candidates in a presidential primary are eligible for partial public financing in the form of matching funds. Up to $250 of each individual contribution will be matched by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund during the primary period. In order to qualify for matching funds the candidate must raise at least $5,000 in each of at least 20 states. They must also agree to:

- Limit campaign spending for all primary elections to $10 million plus a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). For 2008 this was $42.05 Million. This is called the national spending limit.
- Limit campaign spending in each state to $200,000 plus COLA, or to a specified amount based on the number of voting age individuals in the state (plus COLA), whichever is greater.
- Limit spending from personal funds to $50,000.

(FEC, 2008)

Presidential nominees of each major party are eligible for full public financing of $20 Million plus a cost of living adjustment, in 2008 this was $84.1 Million. In order to qualify they must accept an expenditure limit of the public grant, and may not accept private contributions. Minor parties do not get the same public financing, but can become eligible for partial public financing if the party is able to demonstrate popular support (FEC, 2008).
Minnesota’s Public Financing Program

Minnesota passed its Ethical Practices Act in 1974, and conducted its first publically financed elections in 1976. Voters in the state were given the option of funding the system with a $5.00 checkbox on their tax return and earmark the money to go to a specific party or the general campaign fund. The county collects the money and gives it to the parties whom must then return it to the legislators running for office. Winners of the party primaries receive their public money after their victory. General fund money is distributed to statewide candidates for office (21% governor and lt. governor, 23.3% to senate races, and 46.6% to representative races) in equal parts (Donnay & Ramsden, 1995).

Candidates for state legislature who are on the ballot and have an opponent are eligible to receive a public subsidy. Candidates who decide to accept the public subsidy agree to limit their own contributions to $5,000, to make no independent expenditures, and can accept contributions up to $50 from individuals. The public subsidy is limited to a maximum of 50% of the expenditure limit. Additionally first time candidates are allowed a 10% increase in their spending limit, and candidates that win a closely contested primary get a 20% increase. If a candidate’s opponent does not participate in the program they may apply to have spending limits waived altogether (Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board, 2007).

In 1980 Minnesota added a provision requiring candidates that accept public money to agree to spending limits. This caused a drop in participation of the system from 92% to 66% as the limit of $7,500 was considered too low to run an effective campaign. In 1982 this limit was indexed to inflation, and participation rose back to near pre-cap levels (Donnay & Ramsden, 1995). The table below shows participation in the Minnesota program, note that before 1982 the “spending limit” was merely a figure used to calculate the subsidy, not an actual limit.

Table 1 - Minnesota Public Subsidy Amounts & Program Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>House Spending Limit</th>
<th>Senate Spending Limit</th>
<th>Participation Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>$15,885</td>
<td>$31,770</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>$16,775</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>$17,728</td>
<td>$35,356</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>$18,597</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$20,335</td>
<td>$40,669</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$21,576</td>
<td>$43,150</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$21,576</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>$22,784</td>
<td>$45,568</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$24,083</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Minnesota's program has generally been considered effective in fostering competition. Throughout the 1990’s the number of incumbents contested by a major party candidate has mostly remained above 90%. Additionally between 1998 and 2004 the number of competitive races in Minnesota increased (Mayer, 2005a). However a study by Dooney and Ramsden suggests that between 1976 and 1990 the public financing program in Minnesota favored incumbents, with races where both candidates participate incumbents were more likely to get a greater vote share. However the study also concluded that increasing the expenditure limit for challengers would likely close this gap (Donnay & Ramsden, 1995).

**Wisconsin's Public Financing Program**

In 1977 Wisconsin built a scheme for public financing of state legislative elections and created the Wisconsin Elections Campaign Fund. Voters are given the option of directing money to the fund through a $1 check-off on their state income tax return. With the check-offs being the sole source of funding for the Campaign Fund, grants are based on the size of the fund for the year divided by the number of eligible candidates (Wisconsin State Elections Board, 1996).

Candidates who wish to receive a grant from the fund must demonstrate a viable candidacy through raising contributions from individuals in the amount of $100 or less. They must win their party primary with at least 6% of the total vote and be opposed in the general election. Candidates are not permitted to use the grant money for primary race expenditures. Expenditure limits are waived if a participating candidate’s opponent does not participate in the public finance program. Additionally because the actual grant from Wisconsin’s Election Campaign Fund does not usually reach the maximum, candidates are allowed to make-up the difference by accepting PAC money (Wisconsin State Elections Board, 1996).

**Table 2 - Wisconsin Spending Limits & Maximum Grant Sizes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Primary Spending Limit</th>
<th>Election Spending Limit</th>
<th>Total Spending Limit</th>
<th>Candidate Self- Contribution Limit</th>
<th>Amount of Individual Contributions of $100 or Less to Qualify</th>
<th>Maximum Grant Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Senate</td>
<td>$21,575</td>
<td>$21,575</td>
<td>$34,500</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>$3,450</td>
<td>$15,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Assembly</td>
<td>$10,775</td>
<td>$10,775</td>
<td>$17,250</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,725</td>
<td>$7,763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Wisconsin State Elections Board, 1996)
Due to the fact that Wisconsin has not updated its maximum grant limits since 1986 and the fact the Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund has not been able to provide full grants, its program is largely considered irrelevant. Participation in the program is low and incumbents often go uncontested. Only about half of incumbents face a major party opponent. Only about 20%-25% of candidates faced competitive races in elections between 1990 and 2004. This keeps incumbent re-election rates in Wisconsin to around 95% (Mayer, 2005a). In 2008 only 26 candidates for the general assembly applied for and received a grant, and only 4.9% of taxpayers checked the box to donate money to the campaign fund (Jones, 2008). Wisconsin’s program stands as an example of the pitfalls of public financing and the problems that the programs can run into. Without proper funding, candidates will not participate, and thus the program is rendered ineffective.

**Maine’s Public Financing Program**

In the 1996 General Election the Maine Clean Election Act was passed by referendum. The act created a voluntary public financing mechanism for candidates running for governor or state legislature. The goals of the program according to the 2007 Study Report are as follows:

- increasing the competitiveness of elections by providing a viable, alternative system of campaign financing for candidates;
- allowing participating candidates to spend more time communicating with voters;
- decreasing the importance of fundraising in legislative and gubernatorial campaigns;
- reducing the actual and perceived influence of private money in legislative and gubernatorial elections;
- controlling the increase of campaign spending by candidates; and
- allowing average citizens a greater opportunity to be involved in funding candidates’ campaigns by making a $5 contribution to help the candidates qualify for public funding.

*(2007 Study Report - Has Public Funding Improved Maine Elections, 2007)*

To qualify for public financing, a candidate in Maine must collect a minimum number of $5 qualifying contributions from registered voters within their electoral district: 50 for state representative, 150 for state senator, and 2,500 for governor. Candidates are also entitled to collect a certain number of seed money contributions of up to $100 per individual and cannot exceed a total of $500 for House candidates, $1,500 for Senate candidates, and $50,000 for candidates for gubernatorial candidates (Maine Ethics Commission, n.d.).

The following table outlines the grant amounts for qualifying candidates running for public office in Maine as of 2008:
Table 3 - 2008 Maine Public Grant Amounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Type</th>
<th>Grant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contested State Representative Race</td>
<td>$1,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontested State Representative Race</td>
<td>$512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested State Senate Race</td>
<td>$7,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontested State Senate Race</td>
<td>$1,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested State Representative Race</td>
<td>$4,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontested State Representative Race</td>
<td>$1,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested State Senate Race</td>
<td>$19,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontested State Senate Race</td>
<td>$7,631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Maine also makes matching funds available. The formula for matching funds is as follows:

To determine whether a MCEA candidate is entitled to matching funds, the Commission will add the opponent's contributions or expenditures (whichever is greater) plus the independent expenditures made in favor of the opponent or against the MCEA candidate. If that sum is more than the amount of the initial distribution received by the MCEA candidate, he or she will receive matching funds. (Maine Ethics Commission, n.d.)

The 2007 Study Report highlights several issues and successes with the Maine public financing system. First candidates express distaste for the growth of independent expenditures in the elections. While candidate spending may have held stagnant as a result of the public financing program, independent and PAC expenditures are on the rise. Initial participation in the program was low, but has increased in subsequent years (Figure 1).
Sixty-one percent of candidates surveyed by the Maine Elections Commission stated that the availability of public financing played an important role in their decision to run. Additionally the 2007 Study Report claims that the program has increased electoral competition as demonstrated by a decrease in the number of uncontested races. An average of 35.6 races went uncontested between 1990 and 2000 (excluding 1996) and in 2004-2006 the average number of uncontested races decreased to 4.5. Maine also saw an increase in the number of challengers and contested incumbents. Maine did not see a significant increase in the number of primary challenges. (2007 Study Report - Has Public Funding Improved Maine Elections, 2007).

While the authors of the 2007 Study Report stated it was difficult to measure the influence of money, their information showed that there was a decrease of 77% in the amount of private contributions made to candidates, and that a significant number of candidates and legislators believe there is a connection between the donation of money and an expectation of access or influence. Many legislators responded to surveys stating they did not want to be beholden to anyone. They also found the number of women running for office increased by 18% from 1998 before the MCEA was enacted to 2006. Finally they found the average amount of campaign spending decreased for candidates after the MCEA was enacted (2007 Study Report - Has Public Funding Improved Maine Elections, 2007).
Arizona’s Public Financing System

Arizona voters passed the Arizona Clean Elections Act in November of 1998. The law created a clean elections program in Arizona that gave public financing to candidates that met the requirements, including collecting a minimum number of $5 contributions. The program is funded through a variety of sources including an appropriation, a tax check off, and a surcharge on civil penalties (Common Cause, n.d.). Since it was not passed through the legislature there are no legislative notes or history that outline the goals of the program, but the beginning of the act itself states the following: “The people of Arizona declare our intent to create a clean elections system that will improve the integrity of Arizona state government by diminishing the influence of special-interest money, will encourage citizen participation in the political process, and will promote freedom of speech under the U.S. and Arizona constitutions. Campaigns will become more issue-oriented and less negative because there will be no need to challenge the sources of campaign money.” (Hayward, 2006)

The system works in the following manner: Candidates for state legislature in Arizona must collect 220 $5 qualifying contributions from individuals within their district. Candidate must adhere to expenditure limits and cannot spend more than their cash on hand. Candidates can receive $12,921 for a primary race, and $19,382 for a general election. Independent candidates receive $22,612 if they run for a seat. Candidates participating in the program are eligible for matching funds if their traditional opponents out raise them, up to three times the original grant amount. Unopposed candidates receive $5 times the number of qualifying contributions sent to the secretary of state. Additionally candidates in party dominant districts are given the option to re-apportion part of their general election grants to the primary election. Participating candidates are required to attend debates and are given the option to submit statements to be distributed to voters in pamphlets sent out by the Citizens Clean Elections Commission (Participating Candidate Guide 2007-2008 Election Cycle, n.d.).

If we are to judge the effectiveness of Arizona’s system in the same way we judge Maine’s, then we look to candidate participation as a signal of effectiveness. The following table shows participation of candidates in the system that ran in the general election for state legislature:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows, like Maine, participation rates in the system by legislative candidates were initially low and steadily increased (Figure 2).
While Arizona did not state a decrease in average spending as a goal, the Government Accountability Office did review spending on legislative races in Arizona. Average expenditures jumped from $18,100 in 1998 to $32,600 in 2000 once public financing was implemented. This average went down to $27,100 in 2002, but was still higher than averages before the law was implemented. Unlike Maine, Arizona saw an increase in contested primary elections under the new public financing model (General Accounting Office, 2003).

Arizona has seen an increase in competitive elections since the enactment of its public financing program. Between 2000 and 2004 the percentage of contested state legislative races grew from around 40% to 50%. This reversed the trend of the number of contested races decreasing between 1994 and 2000. When competitive races (races within 10% margin of victory) were measured they spiked to 47% in 2002, but went down to 36%, the same as in 2000. However, these levels of competitiveness are still greater than they were before public financing was introduced (Mayer, 2005a).

**Women and Public Financing**

Research suggests that there is not a gap between male and female candidates for state legislature to attract campaign resources, regardless of whether or not they are challenger, incumbents, or attempting to take an open seat. In fact women have been shown to have an advantage in raising money in less professionalized citizen legislatures. However it has been found that men who face women will raise more money than men who face other men (Mayer, 2005b).
Women however make-up a minority of state legislators, and therefore do not benefit from the
c incumbency advantage that many male candidates are able to wield and also tend to not have as much
political experience as their male opponents. It has also been shown that women, even if they come from the
standard backgrounds that many candidates come from, tend to be more likely to discount the idea of
running for office (Mayer, 2005b).

The most comprehensive study of the subject has shown that women running for a lower chamber
seat are much more likely than men to participate in the public finance programs, and to accept public
funding. However, based on data from programs in Arizona and Maine, it concludes that public financing has
not increased the number of women that run and get elected (Mayer, 2005b).

**Connecticut’s Public Financing Program**

Connecticut’s public financing program, officially known as the Citizens’ Election Program, was
adopted in 2006 after former Governor John Rowland resigned from office as a result of receiving improper
gifts and campaign contributions. The system is a voluntary system that is available first to candidates running
in special election for state assembly in 2007, and now for candidates running for state assembly in the regular
election of 2008. The program will be available for candidates running for state-wide executive office during
the 2010 cycle (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008).

The system is administered by the State Elections Enforcement Commission, an agency created
when the program was adopted in 2006. Candidates receive money through the Citizen’s Elections Fund,
which is funded through the proceeds of the sales of abandoned property. Participation in the program is
voluntary, although all candidates running for office are subject to certain regulations including filing an
affidavit of intent to participate or not participate in the program (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance
Laws, 2008).

According to the State Elections Enforcement Commission the program has four goals:

1. to allow candidates to compete without reliance on special interest money;
2. to curtail excessive spending and create a more level playing field among candidates;
3. to give candidates without access to sources of wealth a meaningful opportunity to seek
elective office in the State of Connecticut; and
4. to provide the public with meaningful and timely disclosure of campaign finances.

Qualifying for public financing is a two step process for candidates. First candidates must raise
enough qualifying contributions from a certain number of persons within towns and cities within their district
in order to demonstrate popular support. This means receiving contributions from 150 citizens that reside in
the district for a candidate for state representative, or 300 for a candidate for state senator. Then the
candidate must raise an aggregate total of $5,000 in small donations ($5-$100 per individual) for state representative, or $15,000 for state senator (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008).

During the qualifying period, a candidate may only spend the qualifying money raised, plus the maximum allowable personal funds ($1000 for state representative, $2000 for state senator). After the qualifying period the candidate may spend that plus the amount given in their primary grant, and then up to the amount of their general election grant if they get that far. Candidates for state representative are granted $10,000 for a primary election, or $25,000 if they are in a party dominant district (defined as a district where the number of people enrolled in one party exceeds the number of people enrolled in the other party by 20% or more), and are granted $25,000 for the general election. Candidates for state senate are granted $85,000 for the general election or if they are in a party dominant district primary, and are only granted $35,000 for a regular primary. Grants are reduced to 30% if the candidate faces no opposition in the general election and 60% if they only face minor party opposition. Candidates may elect to participate in the program, but might not qualify for a grant. In such a case they are restricted to spending the small donations they were able to raise during the qualifying period (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008).

Minor party candidates face larger hurdles in receiving grants; the State Elections Enforcement Commission outlines the following additional rules for minor parties:

- If a candidate for the same office representing the same minor party in the prior election received 20% or more of the votes cast for that office, the eligible minor party candidate in the current election may receive the full grant amount.
- If a candidate for the same office representing the same minor party in the prior election received at least 15% of the votes cast for that office, the eligible minor party candidate in the current election may receive 2/3 of the full grant.
- If a candidate for the same office representing the same minor party in the prior election received at least 10% of the votes cast for that office, the eligible minor party candidate in the current election may receive 1/3 of the full grant.
- Minor party candidates who receive less than the full grant amount may raise additional contributions that meet the criteria for qualifying contributions to make up the difference between the grant received and the amount of the full grant.
- Minor party candidates who receive a grant and report a deficit in post-election disclosure statements may be eligible to receive supplemental grant money depending on the percentage of votes received by such candidate.
Petitioning candidates face the same hurdles, except the grant amounts are based on number of petition signatures collected as a percentage of voters in the district instead of votes for the candidate running as the minor party (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008).

If their opponent goes over the grant expenditure limits, a candidate is eligible for matching funds of 25% of their grant amount once the opponent goes over 100% of their grant, and 25% more for every 25% up to 175%. Additionally if an independent expenditure is made with the intent to defeat a candidate then that candidate is eligible for matching funds up to the value of the independent expenditure made (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008).

METHODS

In order to learn about campaign finance reform a literature search to find relevant reports, articles, and documentation on various campaign finance systems and to find information on the effectiveness of current systems was conducted. This included reviewing the websites of the two states who had implemented clean elections: Maine’s Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices (www.state.me.us/ethics) and Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Commission (www.ccec.state.az.us). Then relevant literature from Connecticut’s State Elections Enforcement Commission (http://www.ct.gov/seec) was reviewed to gain an in depth understanding of Connecticut’s implementation of public financing.

In order to decide upon methods, goals of public financing of political campaigns had to be identified from previous literature, and then based on the goals metrics had to be identified for measuring whether or not the goals were achieved. Based on the literature reviewed, the following goals have been identified as important to measuring the success of a public financing system:

- Participation in the finance system by candidates.
- An increase in electoral competition.
- Increasing the number and diversity of candidates running for public office.
- Decreasing the actual or appearance of influence by interest groups on candidates.
- Limiting excessive campaign spending.
- Allowing candidates to spend less time fundraising.
- Increasing voter confidence and participation in elections.

Interviews

Individual candidates were interviewed to gain a qualitative perspective on the campaign finance program. In order to gain a broad perspective interviews were conducted with a wide range of candidates for both state senate and state assembly. They are as follows:
Interviewees were initially chosen based on their accessibility. An equal number of winning and losing candidates of the Republican and Democratic parties were contacted first via e-mail and then followed-up with via telephone. Losing candidates were disproportionally less likely to respond to the interview requests and therefore are not as well represented in the interview pool as winning candidates. All candidates were participants in the program that qualified for a public grant.

Interviews were conducted using the semi-standard format, preferably in person. If an in-person meeting was not able to be arranged then a telephone interview was conducted. One interviewee preferred to answer the questions via e-mail. Questions for the interview were developed based on the background research for the project, and the stated goals of the program. The questions asked were varied based on the type of candidate, were open-ended and assumed prior knowledge of the Citizens’ Election Program.

After the interviews were completed responses were analyzed by sorting them based on question and subject. Note was taken when interviewees provided similar answers to the questions. Potential problems included potential subjects not responding to interview requests. This was mitigated by contacting interviewees through personal contacts in addition to cold e-mail and telephone contact.

**Participation**

The public financing system in Connecticut has been setup in a way that makes participation in the program voluntary for candidates. In order for any voluntary system to be considered a success, candidates will need to elect to participate in the program. Information on candidate participation was be gathered from the State Elections Enforcement Website and put into an excel spreadsheet for analysis.

In order to discover why candidates elect to participate or not participate in the program, interviews with candidates who participate and not participate were conducted. Information was then synthesized and compared to previous literature on participation in Maine and Arizona to provide recommendations and improvements.

**Electoral Competition**

The Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission outlines two of the goals of the Citizens’ Election Program as “to…create a more level playing field among candidates” and to “encourage competition
in the electoral process” (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008). This competitiveness was measured in the following ways:

- The number of races with two major party candidates.
- The number of candidates who were in a competitive general election race, defined as one in which the winner received less than 60% of the two-party vote or were in a competitive primary race, defined as one where they won by less than 10%.
- The percentage of incumbents who were re-elected.

Data was gathered from the Connecticut Secretary of State website and inputted into an excel spreadsheet for analysis. These statistics were compared to CT legislative races in 2004, which was a Presidential election year as 2008 was, and also had the same district boundaries as the 2008 races. Since the current district boundaries were put in place for the 2002 election, re-districting was not a factor in either election. Historical data was also available from a University of Wisconsin-Madison report that took a preliminary analysis of the potential impact of the Citizens’ Election Program (Mayer, n.d.).

**Increasing Diversity of Candidates Running for Public Office**

The Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission states one of the goals of the public financing system is “Giving candidates without access to sources of wealth a meaningful opportunity to seek elective office in the State of Connecticut.” (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008) Measuring this was difficult, as information on candidate’s socio-economic status was not readily available. However we were able to take a brief look at the gender diversity of candidates running for office. Maine’s 2007 Study Report on their public financing program explicitly outlines increasing the participation of women candidates as a goal of their program (2007 Study Report - Has Public Funding Improved Maine Elections, 2007).

Information on the gender of candidates running in each race was publically available from the Connecticut Secretary of State’s website. By looking at the change in the number of women candidates running for office compared to previous years we got an initial idea of the impact of the program in encouraging women to run for office.

**Decreasing the Actual or Appearance of Influence by Interest Groups on Candidates**

The Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission states “Allowing candidates to compete without reliance on special interest money;” is one of the goals of their public financing program (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008). Due to the rules of the public financing program, candidates that participate cannot accept money from political action committees. However PACs are allowed to make independent expenditures and conduct independent activity in order to elect a candidate.
Due to the unlikely nature of candidates to admit to being influenced by interest groups during interviews, and the methods by which such influence is often hidden we were not able to effectively look at whether or not interest group influence will likely increase the during the legislative session. However through interviews and a case study we were able to take a look at direct actions taken by interest groups in campaigns to influence elections and the views that the candidates take towards such actions.

**Limiting Excessive Campaign Spending**

One of the goals of the public financing program in Connecticut is “Curtailing excessive spending and creating a more level playing field among candidates” (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008). Through interviews with incumbent candidates running for re-election corroborated with campaign finance data we attempted to assess how campaign spending was impacted by the program. Data on expenditures is also available online through the eCRIS reporting system, but the data is not in a format that is easily synthesized. While Connecticut implemented the new electronic reporting system many political committees are still utilizing paper reports that do not make the data searchable. Additionally in its current form the data for each committee is segregated and efforts to combine the data to get a full picture were not fruitful. So candidate expenditure reports of candidates that were in a rematch from 2004 to 2008 were looked at, along with candidates from the interview pool that ran in 2004 and 2008 to gain an idea of the impact the CEP might be having in individual cases.

**Allowing Candidates to Spend Less Time Fundraising**

The Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission states that the public financing program should result in, “Reducing the effort spent on the time-consuming pursuit of ‘dialing for dollars’” (Understanding Connecticut Campaign Finance Laws, 2008). There is currently not a quantitative baseline available for this, however through interviewing candidates we attempted to gather information on the amount of time and effort spent on fundraising by candidates. Such questions were directed to candidates who were not running for their seat for the first time, in order to get data to compare. However it may also be interesting to direct the questions to candidates who are not participating in the public financing program regardless of whether or not they have run in the past, in order to compare effort spent by candidates participating and not participating within the same election cycle.

**Increasing Voter Confidence and Participation in Elections**

Voter participation in elections can be measured directly by comparing election returns from this cycle to returns from the 2004 election cycle for state legislative races. By looking at the number of voters who vote for state representative and state senate candidates we can see whether or not people want to vote for the candidates. If people want to vote for the candidates then we treated that as an expression of confidence in the candidates. We then compared the percentage increase in voters for state legislative candidates to voters for President.
RESULTS & ANALYSIS

Electoral Landscape

Connecticut’s electoral landscape saw many changes between the 2004 and 2008 election years. While the number of open senate seats remained at four, the number of open state representative seats increased from 17 to 22. Statewide the Republican Party lost 11,534 voters, while the Democratic Party gained 109,428 voters, going from 34% to 37% of the states electors. Republican and unaffiliated voters lost 2% of their vote shares, going from 22% to 20% and 44% to 42% respectively.

Participation

In the 2008 election participation in the public financing program was high. Out of 14 state representative primary races, 26 out of 30 candidates participated for an 87% participation rate. If we factor in the two candidates that participated but didn’t receive grants, the participation rate is 93%. For state senate primaries there were four races, and eight candidates. Seven of those eight candidates participated in the program for an 88% participation rate.

In the 2008 state representative general election, there were 151 seats up for election with 242 major party candidates running for office. Out of those 179 participated in the program and received grants, for an effective participation rate of 74%. Only five of the thirty eight minor party candidates that ran participated in the program. It also should be noted that ten major party candidates participated, but did not qualify for a grant, which would increase the participation rate to 78% among major party candidates.

In the 2008 state senate general election there were 36 seats up for election, with 71 major party candidates running for office. Out of those 50 participated in the program and received grants, for an effective participation rate of 70%. Six minor party candidates ran, but only one received a grant and only two participated. Three major party candidates participated without receiving grants, which would increase the participation rate to 75%. We can also look at participation based on incumbency versus challengers. In the house races 76% of incumbents took public financing, while 94% of challengers participated. In the senate 94% of incumbents participated and 70% of major party challengers participated.
In order to gain a qualitative perspective on participating in the Citizens Elections Program candidates that were interviewed were asked if they planned to participate in the next cycle, and if the program had an impact on their decision to run. Candidates universally felt compelled to participate in the program, with the grant amounts set so high they did not believe they could have outraised their opponents and would thus be at a disadvantage if they opted out. Except for a state senate candidate, candidates that were running for re-election noted that the grant amounts were greater than what they normally spend on their election. However even for the candidate with less money, the matching funds provisions of the law discouraged candidates from opting-out.

Candidates that had not run before did not cite the program as the sole reason for running, but did indicate that the program made the prospect of running an easier one. During an interview with the House Minority Leader Lawrence Cafero, he expressed a sentiment that the CEP made it easier for his party to recruit candidates to run for office in uncontested districts.

**Electoral Competition**

In state representative races in 2008, 91 had were contested by two major party candidates, the same number as in 2004. In 2004, 23 senate races had a contest between two major party candidates versus 28 in 2008. In 2008 only one race for state senate went uncontested, while in 2004 13 races were uncontested by major parties. The number of state representative races where primaries existed went up to 14 from 11
primaries. Senate primaries went from two to four primaries even though there were four open seats both years.

In analyzing the races we also looked for competitiveness. Races were defined as competitive if the candidate that won was victorious by less than 10%. In the 2008 state representative primaries we had six competitive races, versus two in the 2004 primaries. In the senate primaries there was only one competitive race in each year. Sixteen state representative races were competitive in the 2008 general election, the same number that were competitive in the 2004 election. For the senate we had six competitive races in both years. By these criteria, competitiveness only grew in the state representative primary races.

Another way to measure the impact of the CEP on the competitiveness of races is to look at the average margin of victory. While many races might not reach the 10% threshold the CEP may give candidates the opportunity to close in on it. If we look at state representative elections that were contested in both 2004 and 2008, and had both candidates participating and receiving a public financing grant in 2008, the average margin of victory for these races went from 47% in 2004, to 22% in 2008. If we look only at races that were contested in both years for the state senate, with both candidates participating and receiving grants in 2008 the average margin of victory went from 44% to 32%.

Looking at incumbent races overall can also give us an idea if the program has had any impact. We discarded uncontested races and looked at average incumbent vote share in 2004 versus 2008. In the house it went from 64% to 62%, while in the senate it actually rose from 60% to 61%. In 2008 58% of incumbents faced contested races in the house, and 75% of incumbents were challenged in the senate. With incumbency challenges at around 60% in both chambers in 2004, this was not a big change. Only 10% of incumbents were in competitive races in the house, and 9% were in competitive races in the senate. This is down from about 19% in both chambers in 2004 (Mayer, n.d.). In the senate incumbent re-election rate was 97% and house incumbent re-election rate was 93%. This is slightly down from 2004 and 2006. Incumbency thus did not appear to be greatly affected this cycle.

The losers appear to be the minor party candidates. In 2008, 39 ran for state representative versus 66 in 2004. Six ran for state senate in 2008, but in 2004 we had 24. However in both years Connecticut did not have any minor party or independent candidates win, except in cases where a major party candidate dropped out and the party machine backed a new candidate that ran as an independent but was effectively a party candidate.

Diversity

In 2008, 102 female candidates ran for state legislative offices. The Connecticut Secretary of State provides the following statistics on female candidates running for statewide legislative office:
Table 5 - Female Candidates Running for Legislative Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># Female Candidates Running</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the number of female candidates running for office did go up, the increase was less than in years before the program was implemented. This suggests for now that other factors are playing a greater role in female candidates deciding to run for office than the program.

**Decreasing the Actual or Appearance of Influence by Interest Groups on Candidates**

While measuring the influence or appearance of influence by interest groups is difficult as such impact is subjective and the state of Connecticut currently does not provide aggregated data on the spending of political action committees, some insights were drawn from interviews made with candidates. Candidates were asked about their feelings towards independent expenditures in their races and the impact of those expenditures. Uniformly candidates believed that interest groups should have the right to engage in independent expenditures and did not favor legal restrictions, but some did prefer that PACs not spend money in their races. Some candidates expressed skepticism as to whether or not independent expenditures were actually uncoordinated as required by Connecticut law, but they did not believe the expenditures impacted the tone or results of their race.

**Limiting Excessive Campaign Spending**

Aggregated information on campaign spending has not yet been released by the State Elections Enforcement Commission. However, by looking at individual reports and talking to candidates we can gain some insights on the initial impact of campaign spending. Campaign committee termination reports provide the total amount of money made and spent in an election in an aggregated form. For the purpose of this report we will look at two races with data available as a rematch from 2004 to 2008 and several incumbents.

Table 6 - Campaign Spending in House Races

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>2004 Individual Contributions</th>
<th>2004 Other Contributions</th>
<th>2004 Expenditures</th>
<th>2008 Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Alphonse Wright</td>
<td>$2,725</td>
<td>$925</td>
<td>$1,039.92</td>
<td>$21,662.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Tim O’Brien</td>
<td>$7,149</td>
<td>$9,280</td>
<td>$16,429</td>
<td>$29,069.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chad Thompson</td>
<td>$820</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>$1,070</td>
<td>&lt;$1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>David McCluskey</td>
<td>$10,735</td>
<td>$18,553.30</td>
<td>$29,288.30</td>
<td>$15,389.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>Lawrence Cafero</td>
<td>$8,170</td>
<td>$18,675.04</td>
<td>$24,763.10</td>
<td>$12,373.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Richard Ferrari</td>
<td>$1,400</td>
<td>$7,350</td>
<td>$7,196</td>
<td>$22,580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Candidates who had run previously were asked if they conducted more campaign activities and if they spent more money. Candidates for state representative uniformly appeared to stick with the formulas that had worked in previous campaigns. Many spent less than the full grant amount, allowing them to return money to the state. One candidate for state senate noted that his grant amount was less than what he usually raised and as a result he engaged in less paid campaign activity than the previous cycle, but otherwise campaign spending was unchanged.

**Allowing Candidates to Spend Less Time Fundraising**

Candidates that were interviewed were asked if they had an easier or more difficult time raising funds under the new system, and whether they spent more or less time on fundraising. Candidates uniformly felt that the system allowed them to spend less time fundraising. The system allowed candidates to send out a fundraising appeal to the supporters in their district, and maybe hold or attend a couple functions in order to raise the qualifying contributions needed for a public grant. After they qualified, candidates did not need to continue dialing for dollars or hold fundraising events.

**Increasing Voter Confidence and Participation**

Overall there was a net increase of voters in the 2008 cycle compared to the 2004 cycle. However an unusually large amount of electors registered as a result of the candidacy of Barack Obama. However voters are not required to vote all the way down a ticket, and so looking at a top to bottom ticket differential can yield some information. For state legislative races there was an increase of about 10% in the total number of voters in the races from 2004 to 2008 versus a 5% increase for voters in the top of the ticket from 2004 to 2008. While in absolute terms more people were voting for the top of the ticket, the greater percentage increase indicates a greater willingness by some to vote the bottom of the ticket than in the past.

**CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Participation**

Initial participation in the CEP was relatively high compared to the programs in Maine and Arizona. Based on candidate interviews, the relatively large amount of money offered in the form of the grant was a factor in candidates’ decisions to participate, along with the matching funds provision for candidates facing non-participating opponents that might out raise them. Even candidates that had opposed the program in the legislature or that have been critical of the program, participated. If the participation rates are going to be maintained, then grant amounts should remain at current levels. Overall this goal was met.

**Electoral Competition**

In the 2008 cycle, we saw a slight increase in competition compared to the 2004 cycle. This was especially evident in the area of primaries for state representative races. Based on candidate interviews, the
program did make recruitment of candidates easier for major parties, though at the same time we saw a
decrease in the number of minor party candidates. Combined with the increase in the number of primaries,
the program appears to initially have lead to a bit of an increase in electoral competition for major parties.
However, we cannot conclude this with certainty until we have gone through several cycles.

If the goal of the program is to increase overall competition, it may be advisable to allow for equal
footing for third party candidates with the major party candidates. By removing the discrimination, the
erosion of the third parties may be halted. However one must also consider that candidates that had
previously run as third party candidates may now consider running in a primary as a more viable path to
victory than running as a third party.

Incumbents did not have their advantage heavily eroded in this first run of the system. Contested
incumbents, and incumbent vote share stayed nearly the same, while the percentage of incumbents in
competitive races went down. The percentage of re-elected incumbents slightly decreased. With such a
minimal impact in this round, we will need to wait for future elections before the impact of the system on the
incumbent advantage can be assessed. The one hopeful result, that victory margins in races where both
candidates participate decreased, demonstrates the efficacy of the system provided candidates opt-in.

Diversity

The data on the ethnicities and backgrounds of candidates was rather limited. If the State of
Connecticut wishes to make increasing diversity a goal of the program, it may wish to add questions on
occupation and ethnicity to its candidate registration forms. This would allow for easier monitoring of the
diversity issue and for groups to determine where the trends are going. Otherwise based on the initial small
increase in the number of women running for office compared to previous years, we may conclude that
initially the program has had a negligible impact on diversity of candidates running for office.

Decreasing the Actual or Appearance of Influence by Interest Groups on
Candidates

While there is certainly a degree of difficulty in measuring this category, the interviewees had input
on issues surrounding this subject. Constitutional issues certainly prevent the complete prohibition of
independent expenditures, but the state could consider tightening the loopholes allowing party committees
and leadership PACs to make expenditures in races. Also by broadening the matching funds provision to
apply to any expenditure made to benefit the election of an opponent rather than just for negative advertising
against a candidate, the benefit of such independent expenditures can be minimized.

Limiting Excessive Campaign Spending

Due to the high amounts of the grants given by the program, it is likely when the data becomes
available we will see an overall increase in campaign spending by candidates. Additionally with an increase in
electoral competition, primaries, and the number of races in general the amount of aggregate campaign spending is likely to go up throughout the state. Such is the prediction of the State Elections Enforcement Commission for the 2010 cycle. By looking at several candidates spending levels in 2004 and 2008 it appears in some cases that the program has clearly enabled an increase in campaign spending for some candidates. This is especially apparent in the Wright v. O’Brien match-up.

One interviewee suggested that the state cut the grant amounts in half. Such a measure, combined with more generous matching funds provisions to keep non-participating opponents in check might be a possible way to reduce campaign spending. However such measures must be taken with caution, as the research from Wisconsin, Maine, and Arizona have all shown that inadequate grant levels lead to an ineffective system that candidates will not participate in.

Allowing Candidates to Spend Less Time Fundraising

Overall based on interviews candidates were able to spend less time fundraising than under the previous system. Fundraising hurdles can be reduced through reducing the amount of the qualifying grant and reducing the number of people within the district that are needed to qualify, but such thresholds must be balanced with other goals such as excluding candidates that do not have support within the district.

Did Public Financing in Connecticut Work?

There is no question that Connecticut’s system, similar to systems in Arizona and Maine had a high level of participation in its first round. Regardless of the efficacy of the system in impacting electoral competition, the system certainly has removed PAC and special interest money that many candidates may have received in the past. Based on interviews and projections by the State Elections Enforcement Commission this trend of participation will continue. Whether or not special interests will increase their independent campaign activity remains to be seen.

The impact on incumbency was rather limited. However the impact on margins of races where both candidates participate provides evidence that as long as grant levels are kept high enough, and participation remains high, we may see the incumbency advantage eroded in the future. Additionally with the program being modeled off Arizona and Maine, and both of those states seeing an increase in competition, we should expect a similar result to surface as more data becomes available in Connecticut.

Connecticut is now running one of the most innovative campaign finance systems in the United States. Candidates are now able to spend more time interacting with voters, first time candidates now have the resources they need, and special interest money has been taken out of the system. Finally, more voters are now voting for state legislative candidates than have in the past. Lawmakers should keep an eye on the system and watch is closely in upcoming cycles, especially in regards to independent expenditures, but with only
some minor tweaking Connecticut may end up having the most effective public financing program in the United States.
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CANDIDATES

1. What kind of independent expenditures did you deal with in your race?

2. Do you feel the independent expenditures in the race either for yourself or your opponent were effective?

3. How do you feel the independent expenditures impact your ability to control the dialogue and issues in your campaign?

4. Would you prefer that PACs make or not make independent expenditures in your race?

5. If you had run previously, did the public financing model cause you to spend more or less time on fundraising?

6. Was fundraising easier or more difficult under the public financing model?

7. If you had run previously, did you engage in more or less campaign activities than last cycle?

8. If you had not run previously, did public financing have an impact on your decision to run?

9. If you had run previously, are there any other changes you made or encountered as a result of public financing?

10. Do you currently plan to participate next cycle?
APPENDIX 2: ELECTION RESULTS

In order to measure competitiveness and the impact of the program data for elections was taken from the Secretary of State’s website and compiled into an excel spreadsheet. Races where the victor got <60% of the vote were considered competitive.

### 2008 Primary State Representative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Open Seat?</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>E %</th>
<th>C %</th>
<th>Margin</th>
<th>Competitive?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E = Endorsed Candidate  
C = Challenger

### 2008 General State Representative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>D %</th>
<th>R %</th>
<th>Margin</th>
<th>Competitive?</th>
<th>2004 Margin</th>
<th>Δ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>116%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>4172</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>2914</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>3571</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2008 Senate Primary

- **D** = Democrat
- **R** = Republican

### 2008 Senate General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>D %</th>
<th>R %</th>
<th>Margin</th>
<th>Competitive?</th>
<th>Rematch?</th>
<th>2004 Margin</th>
<th>∆</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


